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I. INTRODUCTION
Justice is one of the most important subject areas in a democratic
and civilized society. If you asked Canadian citizens to close their eyes and
identify the areas in which they want governments to be involved, and
indeed to do a good job, I suspect that most of them would say: health care,
public education, provision of a basic social safety net for the poor, sick and
afflicted, and justice.
The importance the public attaches to justice is nothing new. It is
as old as Confederation as reflected in ss. 91(27), 91(28), and 92(14) of the
Constitution Act, 1867, all of which assign powers to both the federal and
provincial levels of government to enact laws relating to various aspects of
the justice system.
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The preamble to the Constitution provides: "Whereas Canada is
founded upon principles that recognize... the rule of law." A judge's oath
of office requires the judge to faithfully uphold the law where it is clear
what it prescribes and proscribes. But, because justice also depends on
access to the courts, a crucial role of governments and of courts is to
promote access, of people and of issues, to the justice system. That is the
theme of my remarks today. Naturally, my perspective on that theme will
be that of the judge, in my case a trial judge for six years and an appellate
judge for two years.
Now, this presentation is offered as part of a project on civil
disobedience and the limits of the law. Civil disobedience creates a problem
for the above-described roles of judges. It involves a flaunting of the law.
It often leads to the repression of activists and agitators for change, posing
difficult questions when these disobedient citizens come before the courts.
How should judges assess the way in which frontline law officers deal with
wilful, public breaches of the law? What are they to be told as to how they
should exercise their necessary discretion? Inasmuch as the choices they
made were informed by consciously and unconsciously held political beliefs
and perceptions of what is acceptable to conventional wisdom about the
legitimacy of particular legal rules or implementations, they may lead to
outcomes that will appear arbitrary or discriminatory if given approval by
the judiciary. The courts might inflame dissatisfaction with the status quo
by adhering to the strict letter of the law. Doing justice and giving access to
justice are not simple tasks. These very difficult questions inhere in a legal
system committed to liberal democratic principles. The dissident must be
given some room for manoeuvre, while the status quo is to be defended.
The judge is on the frontline. One of the ways in which judges discharge
their very complex obligations is by reading generously their role in
providing access to justice. This presentation considers how this is done as
judges settle the very narrowly presented issues before them.
For the purposes of the discussion, I divide the cases into discrete
categories. I begin by noting the kinds of situations where a person is
brought before a court almost certainly against her will. Here the judges try
to satisfy their constitutional mandate to provide access to justice by
furnishing the reluctant participant with as much aid as possible. More
strongly, courts sometimes have to consider giving assistance to people who
want to challenge perceived abuses of power. In one set of circumstances,
this can be done by giving organized protest groups more standing to be
heard in judicial proceedings. It might also be done by reading elastically
the apparent legal restrictions on social and political strategies to change
the status quo. This may help to assure the public that grievances may be
forcefully protested in our liberal democratic polity, that the authority of
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law and the State does not require blind obedience. Here I consider two
sets of situations. Implicitly, of course, there will be limits on the extent to
which courts will feel themselves entitled to manipulate existing doctrines.
There are limitations on their capacity to accommodate dissent and, in
effect, to treat it as if it were perfectly acceptable behaviour.
I think the cases that come before judges can be divided into four
broad categories. I will identify those categories and discuss the role of
judges in each of them, with a particular emphasis on what judges can and
should do to promote access to the courts.
II. CASES IN WHICH PEOPLE DO NOT WANT TO BE IN
COURT
This is an obvious category of case and the criminal law is its most
obvious component. There is no formal problem with respect to access in
these cases. A person is charged with a criminal offence and, usually, there
will be a trial and a verdict. However, the criminal justice system is not an
easy one for the ordinary accused person to navigate. Criminal cases can be
long and complex. Moreover, they involve a value of high significance in
Canadian society-the liberty of the subject.
There is another reality in the criminal justice system, namely, a
strong link between criminal activity and poverty. A very large percentage
of accused persons in Canada come from backgrounds of poverty, low
education and broken families. Yet, in the 1990s, government funding of
legal aid programs decreased by 30 per cent across Canada.
These facts-the length, complexity and importance of a criminal
trial, the background of many accused persons, and the weakening of the
legal aid system-taken together, create a real problem in the criminal
justice system. A growing number of accused persons are being forced to
represent themselves in criminal trials.
Ajudge can alleviate this problem in several ways. In criminal cases,
a provision in the Criminal Code is an important potential tool for appellate
judges:
684.(1)A court of appeal or a judge of that court may, at any time, assign counsel to act on
behalf of an accused who is a party to an appeal ... where, in the opinion of the court or
judge, it appears desirable in the interests of justice that the accused should have legal
assistance and where it appears that the accused has not sufficient means to obtain that
assistance.
(2)Where counsel is assigned pursuant to subsection (1) and legal aid is not granted to the
accused pursuant to a provincial legal aid program, the fees and disbursements of counsel
2003]
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shall be paid by the Attorney General ... in the appeal
Unfortunately, a similar provision is not available to trial judges,
although they have an inherent jurisdiction, in the interests of ensuring a
fair trial, to order the appointment of counsel.
Another example of the courts providing assistance to self-
represented accused persons is the duty counsel program for inmate
appeals developed by my colleague, Justice Marc Rosenberg. The Court of
Appeal travels to Kingston several times a year to hear appeals from
inmates in the Kingston-area penitentiaries. Justice Rosenberg, with the co-
operation of the defence bar, has developed a program whereby defence
counsel, including some of the most capable in Ontario, provide legal
assistance to the inmates in the presentation of their appeals. They provide
this service on apro bono basis. The idea of a single judge, and the unselfish
service of a substantial number of defence counsel, show the legal
profession at its best.
III. CASES IN WHICH PEOPLE WANT TO BE IN COURT
In this category of case, individuals and groups seek access to the
courts, either because they want to challenge a perceived abuse of power
(usually by government) or because they hope that the law will provide
them with something they perceive as positive. In my view, governments
and courts should not be concerned about this category of case. In a speech
to students at Amherst College in October 1963, President John Kennedy
said: "The people who create power make an indispensable contribution to
the nation's greatness, but the people who question power make a
contribution just as indispensable, especially when that questioning is
disinterested.
3
I agree with this statement. In a constitutional democracy anchored
in the principle of the rule of law, the courts are a necessary and important
forum for reviewing the laws and conduct of governments.
Once again, judges play an important role in this category - to
promote access to the courts. In Canada in recent years, the courts have
played this role by expanding the definitions of standing and intervention
to permit a wider range of individuals and groups to bring important legal
issues to the courts.
The test for standing in the private law domain is a narrow one - a
2 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
3John F. Kennedy: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962-64) vol. 3 at 816.
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person can make a claim only if he or she has a direct interest in the subject
matter of a claim. For many decades, that was also the test for standing in
the public law domain. That changed, almost completely, with the decision
of the Supreme Court of Canada in Minister of Justice of Canada v.
Borowski4, in which the court permitted Joseph Borowski, a male
Manitoban, to challenge the abortion provisions of the Criminal Code in the
Saskatchewan courts. Martland J. enunciated this test for standing, at p.
608:
... [T]o establish status as a plaintiff in a suit seeking a declaration that legislation is invalid,
if there is a serious issue as to its invalidity, a person need only to show that he is affected by
it directly or that he has a genuine interest as a citizen in the validity of the legislation and
that there is no other reasonable and effective manner in which the issue may be brought
before the Court.5
This definition, coupled with the enactment of the Charter' the
following year, has opened the door to many individuals and groups to
bring a broad range of social issues to the courts.
The courts have similarly broadened the notion of intervenor status
in public law litigation. An intervenor is a party with no direct stake in
litigation but with a point of view that it wants the court to be aware of
when the court is considering its decision. A good example of the role of
intervenors in public law litigation is the recent decision of the Supreme
Court of Canada in Law Society of British Columbia v. Mangat.7 In that case,
Mr. Mangat, an immigration consultant, challenged a British Columbia law
that prohibited non-lawyers from practising law. He said that this law
conflicted with the federation Immigration Ace which permitted non-
lawyers to appear on behalf of clients before the Immigration and Refugee
Appeal Board.
The parties in the case were, of course, the Law Society of British
Columbia and Mr. Mangat. However, the court permitted the following
parties to appear as intervenors to make arguments on the legal issues-
Attorneys General (Canada, Ontario, Manitoba, and British Columbia),
Organization of Professional Immigration Consultants Inc., Canadian Bar
Association, and Association of Immigration Counsel of Canada.
4 Canada (Minister of Justice) v. Borowski, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 575.
5 Ibid. at 598.
6 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K), 1982, c. 11.
7 [2001] 3 S.C.R. 113.
8 R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2 [repealed: S.C. 2001, c. 27, s. 274(a), effective June 28, 2002).
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Ultimately, Mr. Mangat won because the provisions of the Legal
Professions Act of British Columbia9 were found to be in conflict with federal
constitutional power over immigration and naturalization. Therefore, the federal
Immigration Act, which allows non-lawyers to appear before the Immigration
and Refugee Board, most prevail.
My conclusion on the second category of cases that come before the
courts is this: courts have encouraged, and should continue to encourage,
resort to the courts through broad and liberal definitions of the concepts of
standing and intervention.
IV. CASES IN WHICH PEOPLE END UP IN COURT-THEY
MAY OR MAY NOT WANT TO BE THERE, BUT THEY ARE
WILLING TO DEFEND THEIR POSITION IF
CHALLENGED
The people involved in these cases display a mixture of ambivalence
and principle. They are, in the words Professor Rosenthal used in his
remarks on this panel, "people who risk violating the law".
This is not classic civil obedience, because people are not overtly
breaking the law. But-and I regard this as an important point-there is
much less need for civil disobedience in Canadian society today than, for
example, a generation ago when I was a law student like you. That is
because, in the 25 years I have been a lawyer, law teacher and judge, the
law and the legal profession have developed in important ways that render
resorting to civil disobedience less necessary. The law itself-and here I am
thinking of the superb Charter jurisprudence enunciated by the Supreme
Court of Canada in the first few years of the life of the Charter-is now
sufficiently liberal and creative to permit progress on major social issues
through the courts. As for the legal profession, there is now a coterie of well-
trained and dedicated lawyers prepared to represent people engaged in
these issues. Your own Parkdale Legal Services Clinic immediately comes
to mind.
Let me illustrate this significant shift with an example from my
experience as a trial judge. Twenty-five years ago, the impugned conduct in
this case would have been labelled civil disobedience, even by those
engaging in it. The reason is that the law was both clear and narrow and
would have prohibited the conduct.
In the late 1990s, the parties who engaged in the conduct made no
such concession. They asserted that their conduct was lawful although they
9 S.B.C. 1987, c. 25 [now S.B.C. 1998, c. 9].
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were also prepared, in classic civil disobedience mode, to accept the legal
consequences if the courts declared that they were wrong.
A. Daishowa Inc. v. Friends of the Lubicon1"
The Lubicon Cree is a small and poor native band in northern
Alberta. They have been engaged for many years in a land rights dispute
with the Government of Alberta.
Daishowa Inc. ("Daishowa") is a large multi-national forest
products company. The Government of Alberta granted Daishowa logging
rights in the disputed territory. Daishowa built a large mill in Peace River.
It also has a plant in Manitoba where it manufactures paper products,
principally bags and boxes which it sells to Canadian retailers.
The Friends of the Lubicon ("FOL") is a very small Toronto-based
group which supports the Lubicon Cree. Its three principal members at the
relevant time were a peace studies student at the University of Toronto, a
church worker and a Shiatsu massage therapist. The FOL mounted what I
would call an Amnesty International-type campaign in support of the
Lubicon Cree. They wrote letters, spoke in public schools and organized
small conferences. Not surprisingly, none of this had any effect on
Daishowa, which continued to exercise its logging rights.
Then someone on the FOL had a bright idea. He realized that it
would do no good to picket Daishowa's mill in Peace River, Alberta or its
plant in Manitoba because such activity would be almost invisible to the
public. However, he learned that Daishowa provided boxes and bags to
many of the largest and most well-known retailers in Canada. Relying on
this knowledge, the FOL conceived of a boycott campaign, not against
Daishowa directly, but rather against the consumers of Daishowa products.
The first target was Pizza Pizza outlets in Toronto, with placards
urging people to boycott Pizza Pizza. The campaign worked-
spectacularly. The FOL expanded it to other retailers. It worked again and
again. Within three years, approximately 50 Canadian companies stopped
buying Daishowa products in order to prevent the boycott of their products.
The list of capitulating companies reads like a Who's Who of the Canadian
retail scene-Pizza Pizza, the LCBO, Cultures, Country Style Donuts, Mr.
Submarine, Bootleggers, A&W, KFC, Roots, Club Monaco, M6venpick
Restaurants, Holt Renfrew, and many more.
Eventually, Daishowa resorted to the courts and sought a
permanent injunction restraining the FOL's conduct. Daishowa contended
10 (1998), 39 O.R. (3d) 620 [Daishowa].
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that the FOL's conduct was tortious in several respects-interference with
economic and contractual relations, intimidation, defamation, and the use
of unlawful means, including unlawful secondary picketing.
The FOL defended the action and were represented by Sierra Legal
Defence Fund.
The starting point for Daishowa's legal argument was the correct
submission that secondary picketing is unlawful in the labour relations
context in Ontario. Daishowa argued that the change in context, from
labour to consumer relations, should make no legal difference.
The FOL's response was that its activity had nothing to do with an
economic dispute between employers and employees. Rather, its activity
was speech on an important public issue, the fate of the Lucicon Cree in
Alberta. I agreed with this distinction.
Daishowa's argument then became that the message in the FOL's
speech was an economic message, namely urging consumers not to buy
Daishowa's products and that this type of speech was not worthy of legal
protection when set against the losses Daishowa was suffering (profits for
sure, and potentially jobs in Alberta and Manitoba).
I concluded that this argument did not assist Daishowa because in
a series of major cases, the Supreme Court of Canada had decided that
commercial speech was protected by s. 2 of the Charter. I reasoned:
If the great principle of freedom of expression protects a corporation, say Daishowa, whose
simple message is: "Here is why you should buy our products", then is there any reason why
the same principle should not protect a small group of consumers of Daishowa products, say
the Friends, from saying to fellow consumers: "Here is why you should not buy Daishowa's
products"? In my view, the answer is clear; there is no reason, in logic or in policy, for
restraining a consumer boycott.
Indeed, the argument for protection of the expression of the consumers is perhaps even the
better one. The corporation's expression is almost always entirely economic; it is designed
to promote its own economic interests and, inevitably, to harm the economic interests of
competitors. There is no "public issue" context within which most of the corporation's
expression will operate. Nike hires Tiger Woods to speak on its behalf because it wants to
make money and harm Adidas and Reebok. Roots hires Ross Rebagliati because it wants
to sell more winter jackets and hats, and hopes that Sporting Life's sales of the same items
will decline. There is nothing unlawful about any of this--the attempt to persuade people to
purchase your product, and a concomitant attempt, either explicit (e.g. negative advertising)
or implicit, to dissuade people from purchasing a competitor's product, is entirely an
economic message and entirely a lawful form of expression.
The Friends' message has a similar starting point. It is, as Daishowa asserts, a message with
a negative economic content; it says bluntly to the public "Do not buy Daishowa's bags".
However, there is no economic self-interest in the Friends' message; they do not add as a
reason "because we have better or less expensive bags to sell". Rather, the economic
component of the Friends' message is anchored in the same foundation as all of its activities,
namely an attempt to focus public attention on a public issue, the plight of the Lubicon, and
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Daishowa's alleged connection to that issue."
Twenty-five years ago, Canadian law would not have permitted this
line of reasoning. The FOL's conduct would have been seen as unlawful and
the FOL members would have been seen, even by themselves, as being
engaged in civil disobedience. But the law developed in those 25 years. The
Charter was enacted and the Supreme Court of Canada interpreted it in a
fashion that converted the FOL's conduct from unlawful to lawful, from civil
disobedience to protected speech on an important issue.
As the judge in the Daishowa decision, the guidance of the
Charter was crucial. Daishowa relied heavily on a now 40-year-old case,
Hersees of Woodstock Ltd. v. Goldstein12 , which suggested that
secondary picketing was illegal under common law. But I could not
accept the applicability of the Hersees reasoning because it was specific
to the labour relations context. In Daishowa, I was dealing with the
assertion of freedom of expression in a consumer boycott, and I pointed
out that it is precisely that right which is protected by the Charter:
The fact that freedom of expression is protected in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
coupled with the absence of any economic rights, except for mobility to pursue the gaining of a
livelihood, in the same document, is a clear indication that free speech is near the top of the values
that Canadians hold dear."
Today, it would be an easier conclusion to reach, because the
Supreme Court of Canada has, essentially, reached the same one. In
Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 558 v. Canada
Beverages (West) Ltd.," ' the Court dealt with secondary picketing in a
labour dispute.
The Hersees rule ... denies free expression any value outside primary picketing. Given the vast
scope of activities captured within the nebulous boundaries of the term "secondary picketing" from
peaceful picketing to the highly disruptive, an absolute prior restraint on all such activities risks
unduly compromising freedom of expression. It would extend, for example, to peaceful picketing
aimed at consumers, without disruption of access to the store, employment, deliveries or any other
facet of the secondary employer's business. In our opinion, a blanket prohibition is too blunt a tool
with which to handle such a vital freedom. 5
Ibid. at 648-49.
12 [1963] 2 O.R. 81.
13 Daishowa, supra note 9 at 644..
14 2002 SCC 8.
15 Ibid. at para. 70..
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The Charter has changed the face of Canadian jurisprudence, as
well as the art of non-violent political change.
V. CASES IN WHICH PEOPLE KNOWINGLY BREAK THE
LAW AND END UP IN COURT-CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
Over a century and a half ago, Henry David Thoreau wrote his
classic Essay on Civil Disobediencet" as an explanation of his refusal to pay
taxes in protest against the Mexican-American war in the 1840s. In the 20th
century, Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. put Thoreau's ideas
into action.
Classic civil disobedience has four components: (1) clear
identification of the law being challenged; (2) open disobedience of the law;
(3) non-violence (Gandhi: "Civil disobedience does not admit of any
violence or countenancing of violence, directly or indirectly"17); and (4)
acceptance of the legal consequences of breaking the law (Gandhi: "Civil
disobedience is a preparation for mute suffering""8 ).
The implication of this fourth component is that the practitioners
of civil disobedience target governments in their hope to change certain laws.
They do not expect the courts to change the laws because, provided the
laws are constitutional, they acknowledge that the courts are sworn to
uphold the rule of law. Thus, whereas lawyer Rosenthal can say to you "as
a lawyer, in court I will try to advance the politics of my client", as a judge
I can say no such thing. For a judge, the rule of law is more important than
any single law, even a bad law.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is a wonderful time to be a first year law student in a great
Canadian law school. The long tradition of this school is to develop lawyers
who will try to represent people and issues which other lawyers ignore. I
hope that at least some of you will embark upon your legal careers faithful
to that tradition. You will enjoy the work if you do, and you will bring
honour to the profession and, hopefully, improve Canadian society.
16 The Writings of Henry David Thoreau, reprint of 1906 ed. (New York: AMS Press, 1968) vol. 4
at 356-87.
17 The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi (Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information
and Broadcasting, 1958-97) vol. 26 at 538.
18 D.G. Tendulkar, Mahatma: The Life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, new ed., rev. (Delhi:
Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1960-63) vol. 2 at 84.
